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BOOK REVIEWS

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children, edited by
Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder, and Jurgen De Wispelaere. Routledge Press,
2019. Pp. 424. $ 220 (hardback).
KEVIN TIMPE, Calvin University
As Anca Gheaus argues in the introduction to The Routledge Handbook of the
Philosophy of Childhood and Children, it’s puzzling that children and childhood have been relatively neglected as a philosophical topic. I share this
puzzlement. Motivation for the silence, Gheaus goes on to argue, “can
perhaps be explained through the belief that childhood is a state of being
inferior to adulthood” (1) or that “children’s moral status is clearly inferior to adults” (1). The present handbook was developed, in part, to show
the importance of sustained reflection on children for a wide range of philosophical tasks. And the volume succeeds nicely in this goal.
As one would expect from a handbook, this volume covers a wide variety of topics. And as one would likewise expect from a review of a handbook, there’s no way to engage with the whole of the volume’s breadth
in a review of reasonable length. Attention will have to be selective. The
volume comprises five parts: “Being a Child,” “Childhood and Moral
Status,” “Parents and Children,” “Children in Society,” and “Children
and the State.” A number of the chapters focus on ethical issues, including Carolyn McLeod and Andrew Botterell’s chapter which explores
why there’s so much opposition to licensing biological parents when we
already license adoptive and foster parents. Other topics in ethics include
David Archard’s chapter on consent, Jonathan Seglow’s chapter on parent
partiality, and the related issue of filial duties toward parents addressed
by Diane Jeske. Unsurprisingly, social and political topics are also well
represented. Numerous chapters focus on issues of both professional and
cultural interest to Christian philosophers qua Christian philosophers,
including Albert Atkin’s chapter on childhood and race, Serena Olsaretti’s
chapter on who in a political community should bear the various costs of
children, Matthew Clayton’s exploration of political neutrality as it relates
to childrearing, and Mianna Lotz’s insightful discussion of vulnerability.
The heavy emphasis on ethical and political issues could be justified by
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the fact that children are typically more vulnerable than adults in a number of ways that, according to many Christians, should be taken seriously
in both our ethics and politics.
But the volume also includes a number of issues in epistemology
(Fabrice Clément and Melissa Koenig’s chapter on conceptions of child
knowledge), aesthetics (Jonathan Fineberg’s chapter on the history and
value of children’s art), and ontology (Daniela Cutas’s chapter on the composition of the family, which discusses “family” as a cluster concept, some
aspects of which are socially constructed). In the remainder of my review,
I specifically engage only a few of the 36 chapters as representative of the
volume as a whole. This restriction is in no way intended to suggest that
the other chapters are less valuable, but is simply required by the limitations of a review.
As described in the introduction, the volume’s stated purpose is to “[introduce] readers to various debates about the nature of childhood, children’s
moral status and its direct implications, duties owed to children by various
agents and the ways in which society ought to treat children. Our aim is
not merely to present the state of the art, but also to draw attention to the
many issues that are still under-explored and, therefore, to encourage future
research” (2). The volume unquestionably succeeds with respect to these
aims. It maps a large terrain of philosophical issues and draws on empirical and theoretical work from other disciplines (e.g., neurological understandings of children’s cognition and political rights) as appropriate. Most
of the chapters go beyond just offering an overview of the debates and also
advance, even if only modestly, the literatures they engage with. Sometimes
these positive aspects of the project weren’t as robust as some readers might
hope, but this is an understandable limitation of such a volume.
Suparna Choudhury and Nancy Ferranti’s chapter on “The Science of
the Adolescent Brain and Its Cultural Implications” is an instance of the
volume’s many good interactions with relevant non-philosophical literatures. They summarize current neuroimaging and functional studies
about how adolescent brains differ from adult brains and how the differences in structure and functioning can explain decreased executive functioning in children. They also discuss “neuromyths” that emerge from
problematic attempts to bridge brain science and policy-making, as one
sometimes finds in educational policy. One factor that contributes to these
neuromyths is the seductiveness of “the neuroscientific turn” that fails
to properly “acknowledge the importance of social context and environment” (37). Careful attention to more recent work in social neuroscience,
they argue, can help correct this imbalance.
Jennifer Epp and Samantha Brennan’s chapter on childhood sexuality
exemplifies how broadly some of the individual chapters range. Sexuality,
they argue, is about far more than just sex acts in general, and certainly
more than just intercourse:
What else might sexuality encompass? Feelings and emotions including
love, jealousy, and desire (both romantic and sexual); activities like flirting,
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dating, hand-holding, and cuddling; curiosity about bodies and sexual
activities; gender, especially as it affects one’s sense of self as a sexual being
or one’s behaviors in relationships; sexual and romantic orientation; and
more (274).

A substantial part of their chapter focuses on sex education. Such an activity, they argue, has two aims. The first, which often receives the majority
of attention, is forward-looking, seeking to protect and shape the kinds of
sexual activities that children will engage in once they’re adults. (While
they mention a number of criticisms with abstinence-only education,
I was surprised that they didn’t mention its documented general ineffectiveness.) But the second aim seeks to recognize children as presently
sexual beings—that is to recognize children as beings whose present existence includes aspects of sexuality (broadly conceived, as indicated above),
even if it is developing. Epp and Brennan draw on social theorist Jeffrey
Weeks’s notion of a “sexual citizen” to argue that sex education can be
justified not just on the basis of forward-looking concerns, but also on
the basis of a right to access information about their own present sexuality. Here they argue that curriculum could address how sex, gender, and
identity are shaped by other social categories, including sex education for
disabled teens.
Quite a few chapters note that philosophical reflection about humans
can be skewed insofar as the views in question don’t apply equally well
to all humans. Lars Lindblom’s chapter on “Childhood and the Metric of
Justice,” for instance, holds that standard views of agency are problematic
insofar as they do “not apply to children” (320). By largely leaving children
aside when engaging in philosophy, we often end up with more limited
views than we intend—and often without noticing what’s been truncated.
Anthony Skelton’s chapter on “Children and Well-Being,” for instance,
begins by noting that consciousness, agency, cognition, comprehension,
and manipulation of information change radically throughout childhood
and into adulthood. Aristotle famously claimed that children aren’t able
to achieve eudaimonia: “a child is not happy . . . [since] happiness requires
both complete virtue and a complete life” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1100a2–5).
Skelton argues that the best way to reject this argument is to deny the
underlying implicit assumption that “there is only one way to fare well”
(92). As with a number of issues this collection addresses, the philosophical literature on children’s well-being is underdeveloped. After canvasing
a number of alternatives including subjective accounts and objective-list
theories of well-being, Skelton argues for a hybrid view. On his view, to
oversimplify, children have well-being to the degree that they experience
the proper subjective attitudes toward the items on the objective list. Wellbeing is also central to certain questions about paternalism (Kalle Grill’s
Chapter 11) and to what Anca Gheaus, in her excellent chapter, calls the
“question of the content of the right to parent” (159).
Perhaps the most notable gap in the volume is that it lacks a chapter
focused on the metaphysics of what it is to be a child. Many of the chapters

BOOK REVIEWS

121

note that the issue of the demarcation is really important for what aspect
of childhood that they’re considering. Consider, for instance, the following
passage from David Archard’s discussion of consent, which he describes
as “power that a person has inasmuch as exercising it expresses her will
that something normative be the case”:
When an age of consent is spoken of, it is intended to serve as a reliable
marker of when an individual has developed her cognitive and volitional
capacities to that point at which she has and may exercise the requisite normative power. There is of course nothing about the reaching of any age as
such that effects the change from incompetent to competent person. To claim
as much would invite a charge of arbitrariness. . . . Rather, conventionally
marked chronological points serve as rough and ready signs of the progressive acquisition of abilities. (135).

In order to avoid objectionable arbitrariness and issues related to vagueness, an explicit engagement with the ontology of childhood would have
been helpful. Furthermore, it could also be that “being a child” is context-dependent as well; what it means to be a child in regards to education
(ch. 31), and what it means to be a child in regards to the composition of
the family (ch. 17) might well be different in important ways.
Such a treatment of the relevant metaphysics would have helped clarify
some of the other issues. For instance, Patrick Tomlin’s chapter on “The
Value of Childhood” explores both the instrumental and intrinsic value
of childhood. But if there’s no hard and fast distinction between childhood and adulthood, so that both “being a child” and “being an adult” are
graduated properties, then the values will perhaps be graduated as well.
Granted, Tomlin acknowledges the underlying metaphysical issue: “as
everybody recognizes, ‘childhood’ is in fact an amalgam of several quite
varied life-stages” (86). And he’s not the only contributor to do so. In her
chapter on autonomy, Sarah Hannan admits something similar: wherever
we draw the line between childhood and non-childhood in relation to a
particular philosophical issue, “it is hard to maintain that those falling on
either side are different in kind, rather than merely in degree” (116).
Another virtue of the volume is that it can help us recognize that what
we take to be non-standard cases (which we might, following David
Shoemaker’s discussion of “marginal agency,” call “marginal cases”) can
show us something about idealized or typical cases. What can we learn
about the nature of the good life or flourishing from reflection on facts
about children (e.g., their dependence, the volatility of their moods)?
Different items on objective-list theories of well-being might be more or
less important at different times in a person’s life (86). If we only think
about well-being in terms of what it looks like in adults, and especially if
we fail to notice how non-marginalized identities such as being non-disabled impact how we think about what “adult human well-being” is
supposed to look like, then our views of well-being might be problematic. Skelton’s discussion here illustrates something important about the
book—that it can serve as a corrective to a certain kind of idealization that
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affects much philosophy, not just ethical or political philosophy but also
metaphysics and epistemology.
A number of chapters deal with the intersection of childhood with
various identities: gender, race, and disability. Religion comes up most in
Clayton’s chapter on political neutrality. It’s absent in other cases where
one might think it could come up, such as Gina Schouten’s chapter on
schooling, which focuses almost exclusively on the aims and methods
of public education. A few times when religion comes up in the volume,
it’s treatment was critical (though this isn’t to say unfairly critical), as for
example Colin Macleod’s discussion of how some religious fundamentalists who “falsely claim that LBGTQ persons are, in virtue of their sexual
orientation, bad parents are themselves responsible for creating a social
environment that harms children” (171).
In a few of the canvased debates, Christian philosophers (and religious
individuals more generally) may have particular considerations that
aren’t fully treated in the volume, such as religious reasons for becoming parents, how to understand parental partiality, or issues related to the
composition of the family (a topic covered in Daniela Cutas’s chapter).
But these limitations are, as indicated earlier, inevitable given the nature
of such a volume. And these omissions can serve as an opportunity for
Christian philosophers to develop distinctly Christian work on these
issues in the future.
As someone who’s edited a large handbook/companion before, I’m
aware that it’s very difficult but incredibly valuable to get the contributors
to make connections across their respective chapters. On this score, the
editors have succeeded well.
While The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children
is neither a work in Christian philosophy nor philosophy of religion,
there is much in it that Christian philosophers will find engaging. Indeed,
I believe the editors have succeeded in putting together an incredibly
worthwhile volume that has the potential to expand the range of projects
the Christian philosophical community is collectively engaged in.

God, Existence, and Fictional Objects: The Case for Meinongian Theism, by
John-Mark L. Miravalle. Bloomsbury, 2018. Pp. 192. $114 (hardback).
MARY BETH WILLARD, Weber State University
In God, Existence, and Fictional Objects: The Case for Meinongian Theism,
John-Mark L. Miravalle marshals an unexpected soldier, meinongianism,
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